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Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before
you (your Committee) today to present certain views of the accounting
profession which have a direct bearing on the broad question of cor
porate chartering which is the subject of these hearings.

I am the

President of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
which is the sole national organization of certified public accountants

with a membership approaching 120,000.
In announcing these hearings on corporate rights and duties, Senator

Magnuson stated:

". . .In these hearings we will explore the historical

development of the corporation in American society, the present role of
the corporation, the degree to which present laws are capable of properly

controlling giant national and multi-national corporations, and the need
if any, for new laws to govern these corporations."
Although the temptation is great to discuss all of these questions
in some detail, I believe the time of the committee might best be utilized

during my testimony by allowing me to focus on the single subject of the
importance of the role of independent auditors in relation to corporations
and the nature of auditors’ independence.
The work of the public accounting profession in recent years has at

tracted a high level of attention within the business community and govern
mental circles.

This increased interest and visibility has resulted in

large part from a growing recognition of the importance of obtaining as
surance regarding the reliability of corporate financial statements.
As the nation’s economy has grown in size and complexity, the Federal

Government has found it increasingly necessary to engage in more extensive
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planning and control.

At the same time, our system of capital formation

and the functioning of our capital markets have became widely recognized

as essential to the continuing health of the economy.
The availability of reliable financial data is necessary to the es

tablishment of sound economic policies and the maintenance of capital

markets which attract a broad base of investors.

The CPA’s role as auditor

of corporate financial statements is indispensable to fulfilling this need.

Thus, the wo
rk of auditors is very relevant to your deliberations about

the role of corporations in our society.
The public responsibility of the certified public accountant is clear.

His work product must serve the needs of a wide range of users of financial
statements which include credit grantors, corporate shareholders, potential

investors and the public at large.

TO meet these needs he has a duty to

advise corporate management and boards of directors with respect to the

fairness of their financial statements in accordance with generally ac
cepted accounting principles.
Because of this public responsibility and the fact that independence

is the touch stone of the auditing profession, I will devote the rest of
my testimony to the relationship between auditors and their corporate
clients.

This particular subject is especially important since it has

been proposed by The Corporate Accountability Research Group that the

existing relationship be altered to provide for the rotation of auditors
on a pre-determined schedule.

In considering this proposal it is necessary
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to discuss the fact that auditors are sufficiently independent without
the imposition of a rotation requirement which, on balance, would do

more harm than good.

THE CONCEPT OF AUDIT INDEPENDENCE
An understanding of the concept of audit independence requires a

knowledge of the basic reasons why audits are useful.

Because those

who are responsible for the representations in financial statements are
employees or principals of the issuers, they cannot be expected to be

unfailingly inpartial in portraying the financial condition and results
of operations of their respective business enterprises.

Thus the users

of financial statements must look to others to gain a greater measure of

confidence that statements are fairly presented.

It is this need which

is met by the examination conducted by an external auditor and by his

professional opinion as to whether the financial statements are presented
fairly in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.
In order to fulfill this role, the auditor must be someone who is not

only outside of the business enterprise, but is as free as possible from
the influence of its management and owners and from other conflicts which
might inpair his objectivity.

Under these circumstances, the more an

auditor is involved in the work which enters into the preparation of finan

cial statements the greater will be his knowledge of their content and
fairness of presentation in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles.

This is an inportant fact to keep in mind when considering

how far an auditor ought to go in providing services to an audit client.
I will examine that question in more detail in a few moments.
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To assure that auditors maintain a satisfactory posture of impar
tiality the profession has included a rule in its code of ethics which

prohibits two types of relationships with audit clients:
1.

Financial interests in connection with a business

entity which is the subject of an audit.
2.

Serving the audited entity in a capacity which would
cause the auditor to be in fact or essentially equi

valent to being an officer, director or employee of
the entity.

The term "independence” has been traditionally used by the profession
to describe the required integrity and objectivity of auditors and it

is those qualities which are the essence of professionalism.
However, auditors cannot practice their calling and participate

in the world’s affairs without being exposed to situations that involve

the possibility of pressures on their integrity and objectivity.

To

define and proscribe all such situations would be impracticable.

To

ignore the problem for that reason, however, and to set no limits at
all would be irresponsible.
It follows that the concept of independence should not be inter

preted so loosely as to permit relationships likely to impair the

auditor’s integrity or objectivity nor so strictly as to inhibit the
rendering of useful services when the likelihood of such

is

relatively remote.
I would now like to describe more specifically some of the prevalent
types of relationships and pressures that have a bearing on where the
line should be drawn to maintain an appropriate degree of independence

on the part of auditors.
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RELATIONSHIPS WHICH CREATE
PRESSURES ON INDEPENDENCE

Certain relationships have long been regarded as posing such a

serious threat to the independence of auditors' that they have been
prohibited under Rule 101 of the profession's code of professional
ethics.

Under this rule auditors are prohibited from expressing opinions

on the financial statements of a client if, with certain qualifications,

they
1.

Have any financial interest in the client.

2.

Have a material joint closely-held business
investment with the client.

3.

Have a loan either to or from the client.

4.

Are connected with the client as a promoter,
underwriter or voting trustee, director,
officer or in a capacity equivalent to a mem

ber of management or an employee.
5.

Are trustees or executors of trusts or estates
having any financial interest in the client.

6.

Are trustees for any pension or profit-sharing
trust of the client.

These prohibitions have received a high degree of compliance within
the profession and are being rigidly enforced.

Accordingly, the relation

ships described under the rule need not be examined further except to
note that in some respects the proscriptions have been made exceptionally
stringent to facilitate their enforcement.
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Among the relationships which are not prohibited and which are per
haps most frequently cited by the profession’s critics as a basis of

concern are the fact that auditors:
1.

Are appointed and paid by the clients which they

audits

2.

Provide a variety of non-audit services that entail
acting in the role of advisor or advocate for their

audit clients.

Inherent in the first of these concerns is the suspicion that auditors
might unduly favor a client’s wishes when making difficult judgments in
the course of an audit.

The concern is based on the assumption that the

fear of losing a client and the resulting effect on the auditor’s income
or prestige is sufficient to cause him to be less than objective.
The second concern arises from the belief of some that providing

services in the role of advisor or advocate to an audit client will,

in some instances, result in an auditor having to pass judgment on the

reporting of financial data that is a result of his own advice or actions
in behalf of the client.

The types of service most frequently cited as

causes for alarm involve acting as an advisor on matters that are
furthest removed from the traditional field of accounting.

Consulting

on matters that are more directly related to accounting seems to generate

less concern.

This ambivalent attitude toward consulting appears to indicate

that competence rather than independence is being questioned.

Other types of relationships with clients which are not prohibited
are those which are purely social in nature.

While it is recognized

that a close personal friendship between an auditor and a principal

-7-

officer of the client could pose a problem* it would be difficult to knew

where to draw the line of impropriety.

All of the relationships with audit clients described above —
whether currently prohibited or not — hold at least some potential
for eroding the objectivity or integrity of auditors.

wise would be less than realistic.

To argue other

However, an appraisal of the inpact

of these pressures on the performance of auditors must take into account

the countervailing pressures which influence auditors to maintain their

independence.

It should be recognized that elimination of all conflicts

of interest is generally not practicable in any area of economic or social
The objective should be to reduce the potential risks to an ac

life.

ceptable level.

COUNTERVAILING PRESSURES

There are two general factors that would normally cause auditors
to resist pressures in their dealings with clients.

The first of these

is a strong sense of personal probity and professional pride that is

inculcated in every CPA as a part of his professional training.

The

second is the fact that CPAs typically serve a large number of different

clients and are, therefore, not beholden to any single client for their
livelihood.

However, the independence of auditors does not depend solely on

these traditional conditions.

forces.

They are augmented by some very powerful

Principal among these are the threat of lawsuits and the risk

of losing the rights to practice.
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The scores of lawsuits against auditors, spawned principally by
business failures, have caused great concern among CPA firms.

Con

fronted by the ever-present threat of litigation, auditors would be
foolhardy in the extreme to risk their careers by being less than ob
jective in performing their audits.

They also face possible loss of their rights to practice by

revocation of their CPA certificates by state boards of accountancy.

This threat and the exposure to legal liability generate pressures of
such severity that they would normally be expected to prevail over the
impact of most types of relationships with audit clients.

The profession has also instigated and supported a number of im

portant programs and procedures to enhance the ability of auditors to
resist pressures on their independence.
The profession’s disciplinary machinery inposes sanctions for viola

tions of its code of professional ethics.

This can result in the impair

ment of an auditor’s reputation and his ability to attract and retain

clients and staff.
The establishment and strengthening of corporate audit committees

composed of non-management directors has long been advocated by the
AICPA.

This effort has now gained considerable momentum and promises

to provide substantial safeguards to protect the freedom of auditors

from undue management influence.
The AICPA also worked closely with the Securities and Exchange

Commission in urging and assisting in the development of that agency’s re
quirements that information on changes in auditors be included in Form 8K

reports of registrants.

This reporting requirement is designed to disclose
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those cases in which auditors were dismissed because they did not agree
with management’s financial statements and were unwilling to express
an unqualified opinion unless the statements were changed.

The

position of auditors is strengthened by this procedure because manage

ment is more inclined to seek agreement than to engage new auditors
and explain its actions in a public report.

Another important safeguard is provided by the program of quality
control review employed within CPA. firms.

Partners or independent re

viewers who have not been directly involved in a specific audit evaluate

the judgments and work of those who have performed the audit before a
report is issued.

These reviews are supplemented by post-release re

views of samples of audits performed by operating offices of the firms.

Such intra-firm reviews of the quality of the work of operating offices

are conducted periodically by teams of qualified audit personnel, generally

partners, from other operating offices of the firm.
Similar quality control reviews of firms are also being carried out
independently or under a program sponsored fay the AICPA.

Under the program,

reviews are conducted either fay other CPA firms as a professional engagement

or fay panels of auditors drawn by the AICPA from other firms.
The combination of the foregoing mechanisms, coupled with penalties

which can be imposed for inadequate performance, provide a formidable

defense against the possibility that an auditor will yield to pressures
which might tend to impair his objectivity or integrity.

As a result,

the number of cases in which auditors have clearly succumbed to a client’s
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demands at the expense of the public interest has been exceedingly
small.
This is not to say that there have been no failures in the execution

of audit procedures nor any defective judgments exercised in grey areas

in which the appropriate accounting and reporting was difficult to deter
mine because it depended on the outcome of future events.

In any pro

fession, it would be unreasonable and prohibitedly expensive to impose

a standard of zero defects and this is especially so with respect to
The existence of fallibility in

the auditing of financial statements.

execution, however, should not be misconstrued as incontestable evidence
that auditors lack objectivity or integrity.

ALTERNATIVES SUGGESTED
BY CRITICS
In addition to these restraints against loss of independence, a

number of more radical steps have been proposed by critics.
One such proposal is that companies should be required to engage

new auditors every three to five years.

It is asserted that required

rotation would provide auditors with greater freedom from influence
by management because their limited tenure would minimize fear of losing
a client.

At first blush, a rotation requirement might seem beneficial in
bolstering the independence of auditors.

would be paid for such a requirement.

However a considerable price

The most effective audits are

generally performed by auditors who have acquired a thorough knowledge
of the business entity under review.

It is generally recognized that

such knowledge is best gained through actual audit experience over a

considerable period of years.

This level of expertise would be substantially
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dissipated by a system of periodic rotation.

Furthermore, the costs of

audits would increase because of frequent duplications of start-up

learning time and development of a background data base that underlies
every audit.

CPA firms have for many years rotated their personnel on audit
engagements to bring fresh viewpoints to bear on the audit process.

This

is accomplished on a gradual basis which permits the retention of con

tinuity, thereby avoiding many of the disadvantages that would result

from the rotation of firms.

To the extent that there are advantages

to be gained by rotation, they are largely achieved by these alternative

procedures of systematically bringing new personnel into audit engagements.
When all of these factors are considered it seems likely that on

balance a requirement to rotate audit firms would weaken rather than
strengthen the effectiveness of auditors and the costs of audits would
be increased.

Accordingly the proposal should not be adopted because

it would be counter-productive.
A second proposal is that often advanced by the profession's
critics is that the scope of services of auditors be restricted to pre

clude those services which are perceived to create adverse pressures

on the objectivity and integrity of auditors.

There are varying

opinions among the critics as to what specific services should be pro

hibited and whether the restriction should extend only to audit clients
or to all clients regardless of whether audits are performed for such
clients.
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Among the services which have been cited as posing a threat to
auditor independence are the following broad categories:

1.

Advice leading to management decisions and as
sistance with systems and their implementation.

2.

Preparation of accounting records or financial

statements which are subsequently audited by the
preparing firm.
The concern underlying both of these categories is that an auditor

may be biased in reporting on the reliability of financial statements
based upon the results of decisions or systems in which he played
an advisory role or assisted in their implementation.

It is alleged

that under such circumstances an auditor would be reluctant to concede
that his advice or assistance to the client had been faulty.

This

reluctance would be evidenced by expressing a favorable opinion on

financial statements that failed to reflect any adverse results of
the auditor's services to the client.

No doubt the providing of non-audit services to audit clients could

create sane potential for conflicts that might affect the objectivity or integrity

of auditors.

Indeed, even judgments made as a part of conducting an

audit could cause an auditor to be defensive about such judgments in a
succeeding audit when events may have proved him wrong.

But the risks

of impairment of objectivity or integrity are so minimal in relation to
the benefits that accrue from providing non-audit services that prohibition

of such services would be unwarranted and undesirable.

Consulting services

help management to achieve efficient business operations, and auditors are
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uniquely qualified to provide them because of their knowledge gained

through observation and analysis of the activities of a wide range

of clients.

In addition, the insights gained by auditors in providing

consulting services are highly beneficial to the effectiveness of their

audits.

The quality of audit judgments frequently depends on the appli

cation of expert knowledge about business operations and practices.

The argument by critics that auditors cannot audit their own work,

consisting of non-audit services, misses the main purpose of an audit

which is to obtain a degree of confidence regarding management's. finan
cial representations from someone outside the control of management.

An

auditor does not fall under the control of management simply by rendering

non-audit services.

Thus his ability to lend credibility to financial

statements should not be diminished.

To the contrary, he will know more

about the client and its affairs and is likely to be a more effective
auditor.

All of the foregoing factors, coupled with the fact that auditors
serve many clients and provide all these services from the posture
of an outside contractor, tend to keep pressures on their objectivity
and integrity within acceptable limits.

On balance, then, the dis

advantages would far outweigh the benefits if auditors were precluded
from providing non-audit services to their audit clients.

Most of the other suggestions of critics are directed at changing
the fact that auditors are appointed and paid for their services by their
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audit clients.

Some have proposed that auditors be paid out of a pool

of funds created by assessments against companies subject to audit.

This

misses the principal issue since it is the appointment of the auditor

which counts rather than how he is paid.

Others have suggested that a government agency have the power to

appoint and dismiss auditors or that all audits be conducted by govern

ment employees rather than by members of a private profession.
These proposals are so drastic that if they were adopted they would

virtually destroy any vestiges of a private profession.

Such an in

vasion of the private sector by government would not seem warranted in
the light of the many achievements of the public accounting profession and
the advantages of its retention.

Indeed, there is no assurance that a

government bureaucracy would perform the audit function nearly as well
as the private profession.

Furthermore, transfer of the audit function

to a government agency runs the risk that it may be used for partisan
political purposes.

Short of converting the private profession to a government function
there would seem to be no practical alternative to the present system
under which auditors are appointed and paid by their clients.

In any

event, the pressures that stem from a fear of dismissal and loss of fees

are probably not nearly as great as might be contended by critics of
the profession.

Also, the countervailing pressures which have been

previously cited are of such magnitude that any drastic changes in
the present system would seen to be unwarranted.
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CONCL
USIONS

To sum up, auditors cannot practice their c
alling without being
exposed to pressures upon their integrity and objectivity.

To define

and proscribe all such situations would be impracticable.

The pressures that accompany normal relationships with clients

are offset by powerful countervailing

restraints.

These include the.

possibility of legal liability, professional discipline involving revo
cation of the right to practice, loss of reputation

and t
he inculcated

resistance of a professional to any infringement upon his basic objec

tivity and integrity.
In deciding which types of relationships should be prohibited,
both the magnitude of the threat posed by a relationship and the force

of countervailing pressures have to be weighed.

Such judgments should be

based on whether reasonable men, having knowledge of all toe facts and
taking into consideration normal strength of character and normal be

havior under the circumstances, would conclude a particular relationship
would pose an unacceptable threat to an auditor’s objectivity or integrity.

The profession has applied these criteria in establishing its

prohibitions of relationships between auditors and their clients.

It

believes that those prohibitions are adequate to assure the independence

of auditors.
The profession has also taken steps to minimize the pressures on

auditors by urging the establishment of corporate audit committees and
assisting in the development of reporting requirements on changes in

auditors.

Safeguards to assure a high level of performance have also
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been imposed by adopting and carrying on extensive quality control
review programs and requiring continuing professional education by

practitioners.

In short, the profession is doing all that can reasonably be ex

pected to assure that a high level of independence is maintained by
auditors.

However, no procedures or system of constraints, whether

self-imposed or invoked by government, can provide a guarantee of zero

Even though there have been failures in the performance of auditors
they have been miniscule in number in relation to the overall volume of

audits performed.

When failures have occurred they have rarely involved

impairment of objectivity or integrity.

In almost all instances audit

judgments were found to be faulty in the light of hindsight, audit
procedures were not effectively applied or generally accepted accounting

principles had not been sufficiently narrowed to deal appropriately

with new forms of business transactions.

None of these shortcomings

would have been cured by the rotation of auditors, restrictions on the

scope of services of auditors, different methods of appointment or renumer

ation of auditors or transfer of the audit function to a governmental body.
The problems that have been encountered are to a large extent inherent
in the difficulties in accounting for and reporting in a highly condensed

format on the operations of large complex corporate structures.

impair

ment of the independence of auditors, is not a principal or fundamental
cause of the few shortcomings that have been encountered in audited financial
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statements.

Auditors have, overall, displayed a remarkable degree of

objectivity and integrity in fulfilling their role and are likely to

do so in the future without, changes, in the present system of constraints.
We realize that many issues other than the role and independence
of auditors might be brought to at these hearings on which the AICPA
has expertise.

We of course stand ready to be of whatever assistance

we can and look forward to working with the Committee and its staff.

